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For at least one hundred years, American lawyers and scholars alike
have repeatedly criticized various aspects of legal practice, identifying
both particular instances of misconduct among lawyers and more general
concerns regarding the character of the legal profession.' In turn, the
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. LL.M., Columbia University;
J.D., Fordham University; Rabbinical Ordination, Yeshiva University; B.A., Yeshiva
University. An earlier version of this Essay was delivered on February 14, 2007, as part of
the Jewish Law Lecture Series at the University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank Dean
Robert Butkin for inviting me to present these remarks, and I thank Marty Belsky, Randy
Lee, Russ Pearce, Irma Russell, Tom Shaffer, and Fred Zacharias for helpful
conversations. Finally, I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, and Rachel for continued
encouragement.
1. See, e.g., ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (collecting essays that examine the failure of
Enron from "business, financial, legal, and ethical perspectives"); MARY ANN GLENDON,
A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed., 1983)
(collecting essays that "ask whether the professional ideal is itself morally worthy");
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) (addressing "a crisis in the
American legal profession," namely that it "now stands in danger of losing its soul"); SOL
M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994) (proposing to
offer "suggestions as to how we lawyers might rekindle pride in our profession and restore
the practice of law to the respected position it once occupied"); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 1 (2000) (noting that "it appears from the chronic laments by
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organized American bar has engaged in a number of efforts to improve
both the ethical conduct and the reputation of lawyers. These efforts
range from the adoption of ethics codes, often revisited, reconsidered,
and, at times, substantially revised,' to seemingly perennial
critics" that "[t]awyers belong to a profession permanently in decline"); THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AM. BAR ASS'N,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL

CONTINUUM 207-21 (1992) (identifying and developing four categories of values that are
fundamental to the legal profession); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 1

(1998) ("No social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as the lawyer's, and
no social role so consistently disappoints the aspirations it encourages."); Roger C.
Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS.
LAW. 143 (2002); Eugene R. Gaetke, Foreword, Renewed Introspection and the Legal
Profession, 87 KY. L.J. 903, 903 (1999) (noting that "the legal profession is again immersed
in a process of self-assessment, reflection, and reform" partly because "the nation is again
enduring turmoil engendered by allegations of indiscretion and misconduct at the highest
levels of our national government . . . lawyers are inordinately implicated"); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185 (2003); Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies
and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS 51
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 33 (1988) (discussing the professional autonomy of lawyers and stating that "the
norms of independent practice need to be authoritatively declared and promoted, acted
upon by powerful lawyers, and institutionalized in elite legal practice" to be effective);
Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 195
(2003) (arguing that "without lawyers, few corporate scandals would exist"); Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A BehavioralInquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility
for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 77 (1993) (asserting that "the apparent incidence
of complicity must trouble both the public and the profession" even without actual data on
the frequency of complicity or the effects of attorney efforts to deter client misconduct);
Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism:Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REV.
217 (2002) (examining the views of Dean Anthony Kronman, including his "loss of faith in
the legal profession"); Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the
Origins of the Business/ProfessionDichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005); David Luban, The
Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 83, 85-86 (relating the
example of Edward Bennett Wiliams's use of a tactic called "graymailing" in his defense
of former CIA director Richard Helms); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and
Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30
(2005) (criticizing the bar for its "visceral clinging to the prerogatives of ignorance and
ambiguity" in response to the SEC's implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley); Rayman L.
Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 144, 145 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek
& Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992) (arguing that "professionalism, as conceived by the
elite of the bar, is a set of symbolic rhetorical and normative concepts having consistent
content"); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1992).
2.

See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'

ETHICS 2-6 (3d ed. 2004) (reviewing the history and purposes of the ABA ethics codes);
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 3-6 (7th ed. 2005) (reviewing revision
efforts, including those of the Kutak Commission, the Ethics 2000 Commission, and the
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professionalism movements, premised on the claim that the practice of
law has lamentably devolved from the status of a noble profession to
become merely another form of business 3
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 48-67 (1986) (discussing the development of, rationales for, and implementation
and revision of ethics codes); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981); Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and
Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical,
Moral,and PracticalApproachof the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411,437 (2005) (noting that
the ABA Model Code or Professional Responsibility was revised four times in eight
years); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Saltwaterfor Thirst?,
I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 323-34 (1987) (expressing doubt that any revision of "a
given set of black letter rules" could create the consensus required to promote compliance
on a voluntary basis); Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
441, 442-43 (2002) (observing that the Ethics 2000 Commission set out to make minimal
substantive changes to the Model Code, but in the end, revised nearly every rule); Nancy
J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
923, 925-32 (2002) (reviewing the ABA's efforts to revise an existing code before
undertaking to develop an entirely new one); Thomas Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977) (observing that "pressure
for revision of several basic concepts of professional responsibility is both sound and
inevitable"); Alice Neece Moseley, Fred H. Moody, Jr., & John H. Vernon, III, An
Overview of the Revised North CarolinaRules of ProfessionalConduct: An Examination of
the Interests Promoted and Subordinated, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 939 (1997)
(examining North Carolina's revised professional responsibility rules); Richard W.
Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001) (pointing out the trend
of successive revisions of ethics codes toward more clearly delineated rules and away from
general standards); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992) (examining "the significant impact that
the [George] Sharswood's treatise had upon the drafting of the codes," and suggesting that
the codes must be read in light of historical context); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 589-92 (1985) (discussing conflicts
between professional ideals, individual autonomy, and lawyers' public responsibilities);
Ronald D. Rotunda, Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility and Ethics, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1223, 1226 (2007) (noting that court involvement has compelled the bar to change its
ethics standards); Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (examining the
"internal politics of the bar" through the development of the Model Rules); Symposium,
Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual?, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1173 (collecting articles that "thoughtfully analyze and critique specific aspects of
Ethics 2000, both with regard to what it did and did not do"); E. Norman Veasey, Ethics
2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Issues of ProfessionalResponsibility in the TwentyFirst Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (stating that the recent revision of the Model
Rules was intended to address the problem of non-uniform state regulation and the impact
of technological development on legal services); Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure
and Regulation of Law Practice:Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigmsin Legal
Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830 (2002) (noting the bar's tendency to revise
the individual provisions of ethics codes rather than question their underlying premises).
3. See, e.g., COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
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This Article suggests that the ethics codes themselves, through both
their substance and their underlying assumptions, contribute to the
problematic nature of American legal ethics. Focusing on the prevailing
and most influential source of ethics codes, the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this Article argues
that the Model Rules fail sufficiently to mandate ethical obligations.
This failure permits lawyers a degree of discretion that relegates many
ethics rules to the status of optional guidelines. Moreover, this Article
observes, the permissive nature of many rules renders their enforcement
largely untenable, thus further undermining the credibility and authority
of these codes as a basis for the ethical conduct of lawyers.
In response to these concerns, this Article looks to an alternative
source of ethical behavior, the Jewish legal system, and suggests that a
3 (1986) (reporting negative perceptions of the public toward lawyers generally); Samuel J.
Levine, Professionalism Without Parochialism:Julius Henry Cohen, Rabbi Nachman of
Breslov, and the Stories of Two Sons, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2003) (noting that
"a voluminous debate over the characterization of legal practice as a business or a
profession" has developed in recent years); Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism
Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773 (reviewing COMM'N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, supra); Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism,
Moral Leadership, and the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9 (1999)
(envisioning how the organized bar could achieve a higher level of moral leadership were
it to approach the profession as a business); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism
Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1995) ("[T]he widespread perception
... that law practice is a business.... has provoked a professional crisis."); see also Rob
Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REV.
259, 276-77 (1995) (explaining the development of the "current professionalism crusade"
and its focus on "voluntary compliance with aspirational standards"); Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and
Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 305, 305-06
(2000) (noting that professionalism movements predictably follow highly publicized
scandals involving lawyers); Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of
Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 694 (2006) (opining that current ethics codes set
standards of lawyer conduct that are inconsistent with public expectations); Anthony T.
Kronman, Legal Professionalism,27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) ("The legal profession
in America is passing through a period of anxiety and self-doubt, an identity crisis of
unprecedented proportions."); Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State:
Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence,and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1339, 1341 (2006) ("The dominant-although not exclusive -modern conception of the
lawyer as a hired gun .... asserts that the proper functioning of the legal system requires
lawyers to remove personal ethical values from their work."); Thomas L. Shaffer,
Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a
Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 395 (1990-91) ("The professionalism campaign is
a nostalgic appeal to a particular kind of moral leadership .... "); Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession, 41 LoY. L. REV. 387 (1995) (reviewing
KRONMAN, supra note 1); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975) (addressing basic moral criticisms of the lawyer's position
with respect to his client and the world at large).
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number of features of Jewish law and ethics might prove helpful in
formulating, interpreting, and applying more well-considered and
effective ethics codes for the practice of law in the United States. In
particular, building in part on my work in the past, this Article suggests
that American ethics codes might begin to incorporate the notion of
obligation that underlies Jewish law, which includes the broad imperative
to exercise ethical conduct and deliberation even in the absence of
clearly applicable regulations. At the same time, this Article explores the
possibility that, to the extent that enforcement of American ethics codes
may often remain elusive, the Jewish legal system may provide a model
for ethical adherence that relies more upon communal commitment to
shared ethical values and principles than on the threat of official
discipline and punishment.
I. ETHICS WITHOUT OBLIGATIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The prevalence in the Model Rules of provisions that do not mandate
a particular ethical outcome suggests a refusal or inability among the
organized bar to take seriously ethical obligations and aspirations.5
4. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical
Deliberationas Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 57 nn.151-52 (2003) [hereinafter
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously] (noting that Jewish law acknowledges the
ethical complexity of legal decisionmaking); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes
Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a
Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527, 543-45 & n.60 (2003)
(hereinafter Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously] (arguing that "Jewish law may provide
a particularly helpful interpretive model for the analysis of ethics codes"); Samuel J.
Levine, The Yale L. Rosenberg Memorial Lecture: Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously:
A Consideration of the Prosecutor'sEthical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative
Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2004) [hereinafter Levine, Taking
ProsecutorialEthics Seriously] (emphasizing that "the prosecutor must take into account
complex implications of the concept of justice," and that "Jewish law recognizes and
address the complexity of ethical and normative decisionmaking").
5. Scholars have documented numerous areas in which the Model Rules leave
ethical decisions to the discretion of the lawyer. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 3, at 721-22
& nn.124-29 (identifying situations in which "[tihe current rules ... grant considerable
discretion to lawyers"); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of
Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265,269-70 & nn.16-22, 276-78 & nn.41-55 (2006)
(noting that professional rules generally use the permissive term "may" rather than
mandatory terms such as "must" or "shall"); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and
Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11-12 & nn.31-33 (1999) (noting
that some rules "by their terms leave room for deliberation"); Fred C. Zacharias,
Reconciling Professionalismand Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1335-36
& nn.101-08 (1995) (listing areas open to a lawyer's discretion in the negotiating context
and stating that "[i]n practice . . . the codes provide authority for virtually any negotiating
approach the lawyer chooses to take"); see also Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion
Seriously, supra note 4, at 49 n.141 (reviewing scholarly documentation of the fact that
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Indeed, the discretionary nature of many of the rules often provides
lawyers the opportunity to disregard ethical deliberation without fear of
serious consequences.6 Moreover, the legislative history of many rules
indicates that when considering the possibility of drafting a rule in a
manner that would require greater adherence to ethical conduct and
principles, the ABA has often chosen a less demanding formulation of
the rule.
ethics rules are not exhaustive, thus requiring some deliberation and discretion on the part
of lawyers). See generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 468, 470-78 (1990) (setting forth the traditional model of legal ethics and the legal
realist critique of that model).
6. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5 ("Not surprisingly, given lawyers' selfinterest and the structure of some of the rules, many practicing lawyers take an extremely
lawyer-protective view of permissive rules. They assume that whenever ethics provisions
permit lawyers to act in a certain way, the provisions are defining an area in which lawyer
conduct is meant to be unconstrained. On this understanding, the choice of conduct
belongs entirely to individual lawyers. A lawyer's decision within the area covered by a
permissive rule is both unregulated by the disciplinary process and intended to be free
from other regulatory oversight." (footnotes omitted)); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Codes
and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885,
898 (1996) (stating that "[t]he more frequently a black letter ethics code is inconclusive,"
the more frequently opportunities arise for "interpreting the rules simply to permit pursuit
of the client's ends, without regard to independent ethical concerns").
Moreover, Professor Zacharias has noted that:
When the codes authorize lawyers to choose between emphasizing partisanship
and important third party or societal interests, lawyers' natural [i.e., personal and
economic] incentives encourage them to select partisanship. Lawyers who make
that choice can readily justify their conduct as mandated by the code by claiming
adherence to the code provisions that call for zeal.
Zacharias, supra note 4, at 1340; see Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer
Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 495 (2006) ("Other rules simply give
lawyers discretion to act, which allows lawyers to base their decisions on personal,
potentially venal, incentives"); see also Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra
note 4, at 56-57 & nn.151-52.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A-C. One example can be found in the ABA's
resistance to the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposal, pursuant to SarbanesOxley regulations, to mandate that lawyers disclose corporate wrongdoing. See Green &
Zacharias, supra note 5, at 271-72; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. §
7245 (Supp. III 2005) (directing the SEC to issue rules regulating the professional conduct
of attorneys); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3); id. R. 1.13(c);
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 173-75 (2007)
(reviewing the legislative history of amendments made in 2002 and 2003 to Model Rule
1.13 by the ABA House of Delegates, and the recommendations of the ABA Presidential
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility).
For further analysis of the organized bar's response to Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, see,
for example, Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual
Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089
(2006); Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004); Lawrence J. Fox,
The Falloutfrom Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of Public Relations Are No
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A. Model Rule 6.1
One way for a lawyer to distinguish oneself as engaging in ethical
conduct might be to practice law in the public interest without receiving
compensation for such service. 8 Accordingly, addressing pro bono
publico service, an early draft of Model Rule 6.1 included the obligation
that "[a] lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal services." 9 As
adopted in 1983, however, the Rule no longer included a mandatory
provision, stating instead that "[a] lawyer should render public interest

legal service."'0 Although the Rule was amended substantially in 1993,
the revisions merely quantified the optional standard for pro bono work,
concluding, in a tone seemingly resigned to idealism, that "[a] lawyer
should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year.""

Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243; Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1236 (2003); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Leslie Boyle, Meeting the Demands of the Indigent Population: The
Choice Between Mandatory and Voluntary Pro Bono Requirements, 20 GEO.J. LEGAL
ETHICS 415, 416-17 (2007); Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "PublicAssets" Theory of
Lawyers' Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1261-62 (1997); Michael
Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A PartialAnswer to the Right Question,
49 MD. L. REV. 18, 59-60 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono
for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2415 (1999); Chesterfield H.
Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 727, 727 (1981); see also Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
739 (1991). But see Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong
Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 79 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey,
Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfortfor the Pooror Welfare for the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1115, 1115, 1119 (1992).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980), quoted in
GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 390 (emphasis added).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983), quoted in GILLERS & SIMON,
supra note 7, at 390 (emphasis added).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2006) (emphasis added); see also
GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 390-92 (presenting the legislative history of the 1993
amendments). Although at least one commentator perceived the 1993 amendments as
indicating a "trend towards mandatory pro bono," B. George Ballman, Jr., Note,
Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That What We
Want?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1139, 1139 (1994), the Model Rules have yet to include a
provision requiring pro bono service. See generally Tom Lininger, From Park Place to
Community Chest: Rethinking Lawyers' Monopoly, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1343, 1353 (2007)
(reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE (2005))
(noting that Rhode's book describes the fifty hour recommendation of Model Rule 6.1 as
"toothless"). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys
General,101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1459 (2007) (suggesting that a mandatory system of pro bono
service may actually result in undermining the service as a whole).
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Pursuant to the work of the Ethics 2000 Commission, which
represented the ABA's most recent comprehensive attempt to revise its
code of ethics to demonstrate greater fidelity to ethical principles,12 in
2002 an additional sentence was appended to the beginning of Model
Rule 6.1: "Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal
services to those unable to pay., 13 Though presumably intended to
emphasize the ABA's commitment to the importance of pro bono
service, the 2002 addition may instead illustrate some of the
shortcomings of Model Rule 6.1 and, more generally, some of the
attitudes underlying the Model Rules.
Specifically, the revised version of Model Rule 6.1 now opens with a
definitive declaration that pro bono service constitutes an aspect of the
lawyer's "professional responsibility," a term presumably signifying an
ethical •duty
• 14 included among the most fundamental of the lawyer's
obligations. Nevertheless, the remainder of the Rule continues to refer
to pro bono service in exclusively optional and aspirational terms. 5
Thus, the current version of the Rule indicates a resistance on the part of
the ABA to impose a mandatory ethical obligation even in fulfillment of
a duty that the ABA has identified as a basic component of the lawyer's
professional responsibility.
B. Model Rule 1.5

The ABA's continued failure to promulgate a model rule mandating
pro bono work thus represents a refusal to impose an obligatory duty in
the context of the lawyer's service to the public and toward those in need
of legal representation. Perhaps even more disturbing, at times the
Model Rules have been drafted in ways that permit a lawyer to avoid
ethical conduct vis-A-vis one's own client, potentially resulting in the
lawyer's engaging in self-interested actions that prove detrimental to the
interests of the client.
For example, as in many professional
relationships, one of the most common issues of contention between a
lawyer and a client revolve around money.16 With the apparent aim of
12.

See Love, supra note 2, at 441-42; Moore, supra note 2, at 923; Veasey, supra note

2, at 1.
13.
14.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2006).
See id.

15. See id.
16. See GILLERS, supra note 2, at 136 (observing that attorney "fees are often a basis
for client complaints or bitterness"); WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 557 ("A typical report of
bar committees and researchers is that fee disputes are frequent, and a high proportion of
client and public complaints about lawyers involve charges of excessive fee charges."). As
the North Carolina State Bar Newsletter has described it,
"Historically, a problem which has plagued both the Bar and the public has been
the number of disputes between lawyers and clients relating to fees. Fee disputes
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mitigating some of the tensions that might arise, Model Rule 1.5 provides
guidelines for various aspects of the lawyer's fees. 17 Here again, however,
earlier drafts of the Rule emphasized a mandatory ethical obligation of
lawyers, only to be replaced by a more permissive version of the Rule. 8
The earliest draft of the Rule required that a fee agreement, stating
"the nature and extent of the services to be provided[,] . ..shall be

expressed or confirmed in writing." 9 A subsequent draft likewise
continued to mandate that the "basis or rate of a lawyer's fee shall be
communicated to the client in writing."2 ° When the Model Rules were
adopted in 1983, however, the ABA again relieved lawyers of a
mandatory ethical obligation, modifying Model Rule 1.5 to read: "[T]he
basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in
writing."2 ' On its face, the change seems merely emblematic of a pattern
of decisions by the ABA, similar to the decision regarding the nature of
pro bono responsibilities, premised on a general approach that limits the
degree to which lawyers' ethics should be deemed mandatory.
Upon closer analysis, however, the modification of Model Rule 1.5
may prove more troubling. As an official comment to the Rule puts it,
"[a] written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces
the possibility of misunderstanding. 2 1 Ostensibly, both clients and
lawyers alike have an interest in avoiding such misunderstanding; thus,
both would presumably benefit from mandating that fee agreements be
in writing.23 More likely, though, the primary function of placing fee
have generated numerous grievances filed with the State Bar against lawyers, but
the grievance procedure is neither a proper nor satisfactory forum for effectively
dealing with the problem."
Moseley, Moody & Vernon, supra note 2, at 940 n.3 (quoting ProfessionalismReport, N.C.
ST. B. NEWSL. (N.C. State Bar, Raleigh, N.C.), Fall 1992, at 8); see also Alan Scott Rau,
Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005, 2006

(1993) (stating that "the suspicion persists that disputes over fees constitute a major and
particularly intractable share of all attorney-client conflict"); id. at 2018 ("[I]t appears
certain that both the number of litigated cases appearing in the reports and the number of
complaints made to the bar's disciplinary agencies give a very inadequate picture of the
prevalence of fee disputes between attorney and client." (footnote omitted)).
17.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006).

18.

See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 60-61 (providing the legislative history of

Model Rule 1.5).
19. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 60 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT (Unofficial Pre-Circulation Draft 1979)) (emphasis added).
20.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (Proposed Final Draft 1981), quoted

in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 61 (emphasis added).
21.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1983), quoted in GILLERS &

SIMON, supra note 7, at 61 (emphasis added).
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. [2] (2006).
23.

See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 503 n.48 ("There are few good reasons not to

reduce agreements to writing.").
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agreements in writing would be to protect the client in the case of an
ensuing fee dispute with the lawyer. After all, to the extent that the

client remains unable to point to a written statement of the fee
arrangement, the lawyer would arguably gain an advantage in
interpreting any ambiguity due to the lawyer's relative experience and
apparent sophistication and credibility in litigation.
Thus, the ABA's

24. See id. at 503 ("The desirability of a writing is suggested by occasional statistics
from fee arbitration agencies showing that a high percentage of disputes involve unwritten
fee agreements." (footnote omitted)); see also GILLERS, supra note 2, at 136-37 ("Why
would a profession -which.., is supposed to put service and the public interest above the
quest for wealth . . . -refuse to require written fee agreements . . . ?"); Lawrence A.
Dubin, Client Beware: The Need For a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement Rule, 51 OKLA.
L. REV. 93, 95 (1998) ("With the widespread recognition that the use of written fee
agreements would be beneficial to lawyers and clients in reducing the large number of fee
disputes, .... why is there no such mandatory rule?"); Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How
the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to
Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 581, 602 (1997) ("Mandating a written fee agreement of some specificity is
probably the single most important step a client-friendly document could take to reduce
the imbalance between buyer and seller."); John Leubsdorf, Ideals, Realities, and Lawyer
Fees, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 621 (1997) ("Professor Gillers is on the mark when
he urges that written fee agreements should be required."); Lee A. Watson, Note,
Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for Maintaining Ethical Hourly
Billing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 189, 200-01 (1998) ("The most practical solution to the
problem of unethical billing is communication between attorney and client because it
levels the playing field and promotes satisfaction of both parties.... It is certainly more
difficult for an attorney with dishonest urgings to cheat an informed client because the
essence of [the] deception lies within [the] ability to withhold information from [the]
client.... A signed contract that reflects the negotiated fee leaves less to chance than a
situation in which the client is uninformed."). Cf Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a
Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? Limitations on Attorneys' Fees in
Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 68 (1999) ("One malpractice treatise recommends that
attorneys engage in detailed fee discussions with prospective clients and that the
agreements be reduced to writing. If shrewd attorneys will have this discussion in order to
protect themselves from fee disputes and malpractice claims, there is no reason not to
expect ethical attorneys to have this discussion for the benefit of their clients." (footnotes
omitted)).
25. See Gillers, supra note 24, at 605-06. Furthermore, the client is likely to face the
question of whether to retain a second lawyer in such a dispute. As Professor Gillers
observes,
If ... the fee dispute does go to court, the embattled but determined client
will have to decide whether to hire a lawyer to defend the claim of her former
lawyer. The former lawyer may seek a fee far greater than he was willing to
accept "in settlement" without a suit. That heightened sum, giving the lawyer
negotiating room, also will have an in terrorem effect on the client. Who knows
what the courts will do? Maybe judges, once lawyers, will accept it. These
realities make it risky for the former client to forego new counsel in the fee
dispute, but then why not save the expense of having another lawyer and add the
savings to the "settlement"? The deck is stacked against the former client ....
Id. at 606; Professor Wolfram has similar concerns about fee disputes:
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willingness to allow a lawyer to evade a mandatory requirement to
reduce a fee agreement to writing may represent not only a generally
permissive attitude to the promulgation of ethical obligations, but also an
outright instance of favoring the interests of the lawyer to the detriment
of the client.
Indeed, recognizing the unseemliness of condoning a lawyer's failure
to provide a client with a written fee schedule, the Ethics 2000
Commission recommended deleting the word "preferably" from Model
Rule 1.5.26 The aim of the proposal was apparently to provide clients, at
long last, the measure of protection contemplated in the early versions of
the Rule that mandated putting fee agreements in writing."
Nevertheless, the ABA rejected the proposed modification, 28 thus
reaffirming the Rule's articulation of a mere preference for written fee
agreements and providing an option for a lawyer to make a calculated
decision that disregards the effects on the client and instead protects
one's own interests.

Fee suits can be ugly affairs .... The lawyer suing for fees often appears pro se,
creating an imbalance of expenditures for legal services that might prove
particularly galling to a nonlawyer client. The lawyer's access to the client's
deepest confidences, and the realization that these can be spread abroad in the
fee suit, may appear treacherously near blackmail.
WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 554. As Professor Wolfram has explained, a client finding
herself in a fee dispute has at least three additional concerns:
A client dissatisfied with the size of a fee or unhappy at the extent or quality
of legal services rendered after paying a fee in advance is faced with unpleasant
prospects. The idea of hiring a second lawyer to pursue the first through the
courts is unattractive because it simply adds additional fees to the original
problem. It might be difficult to find a lawyer willing to litigate against another.
And the delays of litigation may put economic pressure on the client to forego
any relief.
Id. at 556.
In an effort to combat some of these concerns, "[c]ourts quite uniformly resolve
ambiguities in a fee contract against the lawyer, who has almost invariably drafted it." Id.
at 503; see also Wilkins, supra note 1, at 875 n.326 (discussing a proposal to make "lawyers
who do not submit written fee agreements bear the burden of proof on all matters in any
subsequent dispute with the client" (citing COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 56 (1991))).
Another effort has focused on methods of fee arbitration. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at
556-58; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 24, at 622; Moseley, Moody & Vernon, supranote 2,
at 940 n.3 (discussing a repealed North Carolina professional responsibility rule "mak[ing]
nonbinding fee arbitration, subject to client consent, a prerequisite to suing a client for a
fee"); Rau, supra note 16, at 2020-21 (reviewing proposals made in 1970 and 1974 by two
ABA committees).
26. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 61.
27. See id. at 60-61.
28. Id. at 61.
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C. Model Rule 1.6
The approach of the Model Rules to the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality may serve as yet another example of the ABA's apparent
unwillingness to require lawyers to engage in mandatory ethical conduct.
In particular, Model Rule 1.6 presents a number of scenarios that
constitute exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. 29 In the years
preceding the adoption of the Model Rules, Model Rule 1.6 evolved
through several different stages. 3° The earliest drafts of the Rule
provided that "[a] lawyer shall disclose" information about a client when
and to the extent necessary to prevent the client from committing an act
that would result in the death or serious bodily harm to another.31 In
contrast, later drafts no longer included mandatory disclosure, instead
stating that "a lawyer may reveal" information about a client to prevent
the client from committing a crime or fraud likely to cause such results as
death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial financial injury. 32 Likewise,
as adopted in 1983 and later amended, the Rule currently permits-but
still does not require-disclosure "to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm," among other circumstances. 33

On one level, the final version of Model Rule 1.6 may prove less
troubling than the revisions to Model Rules 6.1 and 1.5. The failure of
the Model Rules to require pro bono service or mandatory written fee
agreements seems problematic in part because of the apparent absence
of any corresponding promotion of the interests of the client or the
public. Instead, these Rules appear to function primarily as a mechanism
for lawyers to avoid more ethical conduct. In contrast, to the extent that
Model Rule 1.6 limits the lawyer's obligation to disclose information
about the client, the Rule accordingly serves to protect the client's
interest in confidentially. Indeed, although the Model Rules allow for
exceptions, the duty of confidentiality stands as one of the central
elements of the attorney-client relationship and one of the most

29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)-(6) (2006).
30. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7,at 79-80.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980), quoted
in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 79 (emphasis added); GILLERS & SIMON, supra

note 7, at 79 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (Unofficial Pre-Circulation
Draft 1979)) (emphasis added).
32.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Revised Final Draft 1982),

quoted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 80 (emphasis added); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981), quoted in GILLERS & SIMON,

supra note 7, at 79-80 (emphasis added).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983), quoted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 80

(emphasis added).
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fundamental ethical obligations that a lawyer owes the client. 34 Thus, it
might follow, the ABA's decision not to include mandatory disclosure
provisions represents a determination that the ethical obligation of
confidentiality stands paramount and, therefore, even in exceptional
situations, it would be inappropriate to require disclosure of information
In light of the counterbalancing interest of
about the client.
confidentiality, perhaps the absence of mandatory disclosure provisions
indicates a carefully crafted compromise position rather than a more
lenient attitude toward ethical obligations.
Despite the potential plausibility of such an analysis, a careful look at
Model Rule 1.6, in the context of the official comments to the Rule,
suggests a less satisfying conclusion. In delineating the justification for
the Rule's exceptions to confidentiality to prevent death or serious
bodily harm, the comment first articulates the general principle that "the
public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to
preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation.""
As the comment further explains, however, the
exceptions to the Rule "recognize[] the overriding value of life and
physical integrity and permit[] disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. 3 6 Although the
comment thus provides a rationale for these exceptions, the discretionary
nature of the Rule fails to comply fully with the implications of the
asserted rationale. If the premise underlying the exceptions to the Rule
includes the recognition of an "overriding" value of life and physical
integrity, a more appropriate formulation of the Rule would require,
rather than merely permit, disclosure to prevent death or serious physical
injury. Nevertheless, the Rule leaves to the discretion of the lawyer the
decision whether to disclose information to save a life.37 Thus, Model

Rule 1.6 appears to present yet another example of the ABA's refusal to
mandate conduct that would appear more consistent with ethical

34.

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (2006) ("A

fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's
informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation
.... This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.");
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, at 129-58 (providing a detailed description and
defense of the significance and extent of the lawyer's duty of confidentiality); Lawrence J.
Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L.

REV. 547, 551 (2002) (describing client confidentiality as a "core value for a lawyer");
Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1427-47

(1992) (describing "the centrality and power of the norm of confidentiality in the bar's
nomos").

35.
36.
37.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.6 cmt. [6] (2006).
Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).
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principles, instead allowing a lawyer the option of acting in a way that
best suits one's own interests.
Indeed, given the discretionary component of the Rule, it seems
unlikely that a lawyer would choose the option of disclosing information
pursuant to the exceptions, even in the face of overriding concerns of
death or serious physical harm to another.3 s As another comment to
Model Rule 1.6 emphasizes, the nature of discretionary disclosure
provisions implies that failure to disclose will not violate the Rule.39
Therefore, a lawyer will not face negative professional or financial
consequences as a result of a decision not to disclose information,
regardless of any harm caused to others. Conversely, a lawyer who
decides to reveal information pursuant to an exception to the Rule may,
at times, risk the possibility of discipline and/or litigation in case of later
review of the lawyer's decision and a determination that the
circumstances did not actually permit such disclosure. 40 Thus, contrary to
the outcome that the Rule is purported to encourage, the self-interested
lawyer will probably choose not to disclose information, even to save a
life.' In fact, the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, which
recommended expanding the circumstances under which disclosure
should be permitted-though still not required-seemed to acknowledge
that, in practice, state ethics provisions permitting disclosure are rarely
employed by lawyers.42

38. Cf. David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant
Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client FinancialMisconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825,

1828 (2004) (suggesting that because lawyers are reluctant to create costs for themselves,
disclosure is unlikely to increase "even in cases where disclosure could stop unlawful
conduct or help rectify its consequences").
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [15] (2006).
40. See McGowan, supra note 38, at 1829-30.
41. Cf.id. at 1825 (asserting that "the costs disclosure creates for lawyers who blow
the whistle" must be addressed if lawyers are to be encouraged to disclose client financial
misconduct); id. at 1828 (observing that "[blecause disclosure is permissive, lawyers
choose whether they will create these other costs," and concluding that lawyers are
unlikely to incur such costs); David Rosenthal, The CriminalDefense Attorney, Ethics and
Maintaining Client Confidentiality: A Proposalto Amend Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 153, 166-68 (1993) (observing that, in

addition to the possibility that disclosure may result in discipline, "[f]rom an economic
standpoint, a more tangible, often damaging consequence of disclosure exists,"
particularly for criminal defense attorneys, because "[t]he reputation of criminal defense
attorneys travels swiftly through the ranks of criminal defendants and once the attorney is
labeled as untrustworthy, that attorney may likely be hard pressed to retain any future
clients").
42. See TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), quoted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 81-

82.
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The impression that Model Rule 1.6 produces the practical-if not
intended-result of favoring the interests of lawyers may be reinforced
by the Rule's inclusion of yet another exception to the duty of
confidentiality that was absent from the drafts of the Rule. Since its
adoption, and continuing through every revision, Model Rule 1.6 has
permitted disclosure "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client. ' 43 Thus,
notwithstanding the presumed and professed centrality of confidentiality
as a basic component of the attorney-client relationship and, therefore,
as a fundamental element of the lawyer's ethical responsibilities, the
client's interests in confidentiality lose their special status when
confronted with the lawyer's conflicting interests against the client."
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2006).
44. Indeed, in the words of one leading scholar, "[n]o exception to the attorney-client
privilege has done as much to draw [the privilege] into question as the exception allowing
lawyer self-protection." WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 308. As others have put it,
permitting lawyers to disclose confidences for the purpose of collecting fees "is sanction
for blackmail." FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, at 155. For consideration of possible
justifications for these exceptions, see WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 308-09.
In fact, when adopted in 1983, Model Rule 1.6 did not allow disclosure to save the life
of the "Innocent Convict." See SIMON, supra note 1, at 4 (giving the example of lawyer
Arthur Powell and innocent convict Leo Frank). In such a scenario, the client admits to a
lawyer, in confidence, to having committed a capital crime for which an innocent
individual has been convicted. See id. Under the original version of the Rule, the lawyer
ostensibly was not permitted to reveal this information because such disclosure would not
prevent future harmful conduct by the client. See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion
Seriously, supranote 4, at 30-33, 37-42. Not surprisingly, the prohibition against disclosing
confidences to save the life of the Innocent Convict engendered harsh, though not
universal, criticism. See id. at 38-42 & nn.112-18. The prohibition seemed particularly
disconcerting when juxtaposed with the provision permitting disclosure for the lawyer to
collect a fee. Professor Cramton and Lori P. Knowles argue that:
[A] profession that justifiably asks for and receives permission to disclose
confidential client information when its own economic interests are at stake (e.g.,
to collect a fee from a client) cannot plausibly take the position that the
threatened death or serious injury of another does not justify an occasional
sacrifice of confidentiality.
Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and its Exceptions: Spaulding
v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 111-12 (1998) (footnote omitted).
Professor Fischel observes that:
The same lawyer who is prohibited from disclosing information learned while
representing a client to exonerate someone falsely accused of a capital crime ...
is perfectly free to disclose confidential information when he or she is the one
accused, falsely or not. Nor is there any requirement that the lawyer's liberty be
at stake, or even that the lawyer be accused of anything criminal. A simple fee
dispute with a client is sufficient grounds to disclose confidential information.
The lawyer's interest in collecting a fee is apparently a higher priority than
exonerating an innocent defendant about to be convicted of a capital crime ....
Confidentiality means everything in legal ethics unless lawyers lose money, in
which case it means nothing.
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Indeed, the self-interested lawyer involved in a controversy with a client
might be expected to disclose information in spite of-or, in part,
because of-the detrimental effect disclosure will have on the interests of
the client. Ultimately, then, the discretionary nature of Model Rule 1.6

seems to operate in a way that makes paramount the interests of the
lawyer, often allowing the lawyer to decide, primarily on the basis of
those interests, whether to reveal confidential information about the
client.45
Daniel Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
More general critiques of the rules of confidentiality abound among scholars as well.
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 1, at 56, 222 n.9; WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 243-47; Simon,
supra note 7, at 1453-54, 1468; Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 351, 376-89 (1989) (analyzing the results of empirical studies testing the justifications
for strict confidentiality); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality 1I: Is
Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality II] (same).
45. Even a brief survey of ethics regulations over the past few decades reveals many
instances in which the organized bar promulgated ethics rules that seemed to promote
lawyers' economic self-interests to the detriment of those of the client. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has struck down various regulations that appeared designed,
at least in part, to protect the economic interests of lawyers. See, e.g., Supreme Court of
Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67-70 (1988) (striking down regulations limiting admission
"on motion" to state residents as unconstitutional in violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655-56
(1985) (reversing reprimand for using an illustration in advertising materials on First
Amendment grounds); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 287-88 (1985)
(striking down regulations limiting bar admission to state residents as unconstitutional in
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977) (striking down restrictions on advertising by lawyers of routine services and their
availability as violating the First Amendment); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
791-93 (1975) (striking down mandatory minimum fee schedules as a form of price fixing).
Many scholars have criticized the sometimes self-serving nature of lawyer selfregulation. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 21 ("Few persons who are not lawyers
would judge the ... history of [bar] regulation to be one in which the public interest has
regularly been vindicated."); Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 312 ("[T]here is little
doubt that ethics codes traditionally have included self-serving propositions." (citing
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality H, supra note 44, at 628 nn.138-39, 629-30 nn.14445)); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1084, 1087 (1983) (arguing that "participants in the debate on lawyer advertising have
failed to appreciate that legal services are a market commodity"); Andrew M. Perlman,
Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 999 (2003)
("[T]he ABA's structural rules .. .have emphasized self-protection and public image at
the expense of more appropriate emphases.... [T]here is ample evidence that ethics codes
have, in fact, advanced these goals more clearly than other identifiable objectives.");
Deborah L. Rhode, Keynote, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1543,1557 (2002) ("[R]egulation of the legal profession has been designed primarily
by and for the profession, and too often protects its concerns at the expense of the
public."); Schneyer, supra note 2, at 724-33 (criticizing the bar's insistence on designing
ethical rules to protect lawyers, its disfavor of regulation by nonlawyer actors and
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D. Enforcement

Finally, the discretionary nature of many ethics provisions may have a
detrimental effect beyond the specific conduct of lawyers operating in
the context of discretionary rules. On a broader level, the extent to
which the Model Rules allow important aspects of a lawyer's ethical
obligations to remain optional rather than mandatory arguably
contributes to a general undermining of the authority and credibility of
ethics codes as a source of lawyers' professional responsibility. Indeed,
although ethics codes set forth the substantive basis for attorney
discipline, even mandatory ethics provisions remain notoriously
underenforced.46 The enactment of discretionary rules-by definition
unenforceable under prevailing disciplinary

7

areas central to

ethical behavior reinforces the perception that ethics rules are often at
best aspirational or hortatory. In short, the Model Rules send the
message that the self-interested lawyer faces minimal-if any-actual
risk when disregarding ethics codes and their underlying principles. 48
institutions, and its preference for role-based ethics rules); William H. Simon, Who Needs
the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 640 (2003)
(elaborating "on the widely felt doubts about monopolistic self-regulation").
46. See STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS'N, SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1-8 (2001) (listing the number of complaints brought

against lawyers and the types and frequencies of sanctions imposed); WOLFRAM, supra
note 2, at 80 ("Recurring impressionistic accounts claim that the state of lawyer discipline
demands urgent attention," in part because, "there are ample reasons to believe that
discipline is selective, episodic, subject to constraints of fluctuating budgets and personal
ability, influenced by political instability, and subject to like influences that grossly distort
the extent to which lawyer discipline reflects levels of deviance and compliance among
lawyers."); Barton, supra note 2, at 424 & n.47 ("[T]he minimum Rules governing lawyers
are, in fact, notoriously underenforced."); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 659, 747 n.349 (1990) ("The underenforcement of the legal ethics codes is welldocumented."); Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and the Public Interest, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1501, 1512 (2002) ("Disciplinary rules and enforcement processes have not
adequately curbed ethical abuses ....");Wilkins, supra note 5, at 493 ("[T]he rules of
professional conduct . . .tend to be systematically underenforced."); Fred C. Zacharias,
What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the
Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 973 (2002) (exploring
"the ramifications of maintaining unenforced or underenforced rules in the professional
codes of lawyer responsibility"). But see Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the
Legalization of American Legal Ethics-L Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469,
470 (2001) ("While lawyer discipline was once scandalously under enforced and is still
criticized by many as lax, there is no doubt that its incidence has increased significantly in
the past thirty years." (footnote omitted)).
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
48. See David Luban, Ethics and Malpractice, 12 MIss. C. L. REV. 151, 152 (1991)
(making the "routine observation that the codes are drastically underenforced").
Professor Luban observes that, given the current state of underenforcement,
if one were to give realistic advice to aspiring lawyers about how to avoid
attorney discipline, it would be this: "If you don't steal your clients' money,
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II. THE JEWISH LEGAL MODEL

In light of the apparent limitations on the effectiveness of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in improving the reputation and
ethical conduct of American lawyers, perhaps American ethics codes
should look to an alternative model as a counterexample for the
codification and implementation of ethical norms. Specifically, the
Jewish legal model offers a different approach to the formulation and
interpretation of ethical provisions, grounded in mandatory legal and
ethical obligations that require the individual to take seriously both the
formal delineation of a rule and the underlying ethical principles
reflected and incorporated therein. An analysis of such an approach may
prove helpful in promoting a more serious attitude toward ethical
obligations in American legal practice.
A. Ethical Obligations:The Mandatory/OptionalDichotomy
A number of scholars have drawn a contrast between the
predominance of rights as the guiding value in American law and
jurisprudence and the notion of obligation as the central principle in
Jewish law.49 At its core, the Jewish legal system consists of 613 biblical
commandments, as applied and implemented through rabbinic
interpretation and legislation. 0 Although often dependent on the
presence of a variety of circumstances and conditions that trigger their
applicability, commandments, by definition, require a prescribed mode of
conduct in response to a given scenario.
The mandatory nature of ethical obligations in the Jewish legal system
extends to areas of conduct, such as giving aid to those in need, that
might seem more consistent with voluntary aspirations than with the

neglect their affairs, get convicted of a felony, engage in substance abuse, or get
caught lying to a court, you have little to fear from the disciplinary system."
Id. at 152; see also Zacharias, supra note 2, at 861-62 ("[M]any rules simply go unenforced
or are patently underenforced .... [O]ne could safely hazard the assertion that few rules
truly are enforced in a way that makes lawyers fear discipline for violating them.").
49. See, e.g., Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4,at 544 n.60 (citing
SOL ROTH, HALAKHA AND POLITICS: THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE STATE 97 (1988);
Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 65, 65 (1987); Steven F. Friedell, Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish
Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 909, 913 (book review); Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation
Contracts in the Shadow of No Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C.L. REV. 315, 337-61 (2008); Moshe
Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence,75 HARV. L. REV. 306, 313-14 (1961)).
See generally Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy Over the
Research of Jewish Law Using Comparative Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L.
& RELIGION 189 (2007-08).
50. See, e.g., 1 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 59-82, 23160 (1979).
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dictates of legal strictures." In fact, the biblical term tzedaka, often
translated as "charity," contains the root tzedek, the biblical word for
"justice."" Thus, as a form of implementing social justice, both the
individual and the community as a whole must fulfill a legal and ethical
obligation to contribute resources to those requiring assistance.53 The
legal status and implications of this obligation parallel those of other
financial obligations.In further contrast to the American legal system, the substance of
Jewish law comprises a comprehensive set of obligations, in principle
addressing every area of human endeavor. Thus, the Jewish legal system
regulates activities both public and private, both interpersonal and ritual,
both individual and communal, thereby extending the notion of religious
observance and ethical obligation to all realms of life.55 As Rabbi Joseph
Soloveitchik has put it, "[t]he marketplace, the street, the factory, the
house, the meeting place, the banquet hall, all constitute the backdrop
for the religious life."56 In this perspective, "[t]he true sanctuary is the
sphere of our daily, mundane activities, for it is there that the realization
of [religious and ethical obligation] takes place."57
Applied to
51. See MEIR TAMARI, "WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS": JEWISH ETHICS AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 248-61 (1987) (discussing charitable obligations).

52.

Id. at 248.

53. See Samuel J. Levine, Looking Beyond the Mercy/Justice Dichotomy: Reflections
on the Complementary Roles of Mercy and Justice in Jewish Law and Tradition, 45 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD.455, 468 n.81 (2006).
54. See JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, YEMEI ZICHARON 43-45 (1996) (citing TALMUD
BAVLI, Baba Bathra 8b; MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3:53) (author's

translation).
55. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 50, at 78 (stating that the commandments
"penetrate every nook and cranny of a person's existence, hallowing even the lowliest acts
and elevating them to a service to God .... [,] sanctify every facet of life, and constantly
remind one of [one's] responsibilities toward God" (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel J.
Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and
Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1996) [hereinafter Levine, Broad Life]

(observing that "an individual who views religion as the center of life can incorporate
other aspects of life, such as a secular career, to broaden that life," and concomitantly
unify all areas of life); Samuel J. Levine, Reflections on the Practice of Law as a Religious
Calling,from a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005)

[hereinafter Levine, Reflections] ("[T]he range of halacha, Jewish legal and ethical
thought, encompasses all facets of the human experiences, emphasizing the importance of
an ethically unified life and demonstrating that every area of life has moral significance.").
56. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 94 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)
(originally published in Hebrew as Ish ha-halakhah,in 1 TALPIOT 3-4 (1944)).

57. Id. at 94-95; see also Levine, Broad Life, supra note 55, at 1205 ("[A]ccording to
Maimonides, through my professional career I could actually serve [God], while Ramchal
taught that I could utilize my career as a means towards piety"); id. at 1205 nn.21-22
(citing MOSES C. LUZZATO, MESILLAT YESHARIM 336-39 (Shraga Silverstein trans.,
1966); MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, Laws of De'oth 3:2-3)).
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commercial activities, the corpus of Jewish law, from the biblical text to
modern commentaries, contains a pervasive emphasis on scrupulous
adherence to honest and ethical business dealings and includes detailed
prohibitions against taking unfair advantage of those who are
vulnerable 58
.
Notwithstanding the inherent authority of Jewish law to prescribe
specific obligations in all realms of human activity, in practice,
determination of the appropriate conduct mandated by a particular
situation may involve a complex analytical process, which at times
depends on balancing various conceptual and practical interests.5 9
Nevertheless, once a decision has been reached, the terms of the decision
stand not merely as a suggested resolution, but as defining the contours
of obligation, thereby requiring strict adherence. For example, in the
Jewish legal system, with very limited exceptions, the value of preserving
life overrides other legal and ethical obligations. 60 As a result, Jewish law
does not merely permit, but requires violation of virtually any
commandment to the extent necessary to respond to a life-threatening
situation.61 In fact, it follows that "it is forbidden to delay such violation
62
of [a commandment] for the sake of a person who is dangerously ill."
The mandatory nature of obligations in Jewish law to assist those in
need, to engage in fair business practices, and to act to save a life stands

58. See TAMARI, supra note 52, at 47 (citing legal interpretations of the biblical
prohibition against placing "'a stumbling block in the path of the blind' as extending to
"the giving of unwise business advice to someone, or the provision, through perfectly legal
transactions, of goods that are to the buyer's physical or moral detriment" (quoting
Leviticus 19:14)). Indeed, Jewish law requires particular protection of those unable to
navigate the legal system, see id. at 48; see also Samuel J. Levine, A Look at American
Legal Practice Through a Perspective of Jewish Law, Ethics, and Tradition:A Conceptual
Overview, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 20-21 & nn.51-52 (2006), in

apparent contrast to the client in the American legal system who fails to obtain a written
fee agreement from a lawyer and thereby remains at a disadvantage in an ensuing fee
dispute. See discussion supra Part I.B.
59. See Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously, supra note 4, at 1358-69

("[E]ach conflict poses its own unique challenges, thereby necessitating a correspondingly
particularized method of resolution.").
60. See id. at 1359 & n.67 (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 85a-85b; MAIMONIDES,
MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Sabbath, 2; 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH
THOUGHT 38-49 (Abraham Sutton ed., 1992); HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B'IKVEI HATZOAN

14-18 (1997); SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 56, at 34-35); see also Levine, Taking Ethical
Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 57 n.151 ("[N]early every obligation in Jewish law is
suspended to save a life."); Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Jewish Life: Why a Rabbi and a
Jewish Lawyer Must Disclose a Client Confidence, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1771, 1776 (1996)

("To save a life, one may violate all of Jewish law, except idolatry, incest and adultery, and
murder.").
61. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 60, 2:2-3; SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 56, at 34.
62.

SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 56, at 34.
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in stark contrast to discretionary provisions in the Model Rules that, at
most, recommend-but do not require-a lawyer to perform pro bono
services, to place fee agreements in writing, and to disclose confidences
when reasonably necessary to prevent a death.63 Arguably, though, the
differences between obligations in Jewish law and in American ethics
codes merely reflect broader differences in the two legal systems. The
notion of mandating a particular mode of action obtains from the basic
premise underlying Jewish law as a religious system based in divine
wisdom and command. Because American law instead emphasizes rights
and personal autonomy, the American legal system is far less likely to
impose additional duties.64 Indeed, American law does not mandate
charitable contributions; does not prevent shrewd-if seemingly unfairbusiness dealings, though it prohibits fraud; and does not generally
require acts to save the life of a person in mortal peril. Likewise, it may
not seem appropriate for the American legal system to place such
obligations on lawyers.65
Despite the appeal-and, to some degree, the descriptive accuracy-of
such an argument, it may fail in the context of the role and
responsibilities of American lawyers. The existence of codes of ethics for
lawyers, adopted by courts to have binding legal authority, grows out of
an expression of the special role of the lawyer in American society and,
63. See discussion supra Part I.A-C.
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research
Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 472-73 (1991) (citing the argument that "a
pro bono duty in effect selectively taxes lawyers to provide a public service" and that "if it
is in the public interest to make legal services available to all, the expense should fall on
the entire public, not just on the lawyers"); Nancy J. Moore, "In the Interests of Justice":
Balancing Client Loyalty and the Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1775, 1786 (2002) (arguing that lawyers "should not be obligated to perform as
agents of the state in situations where private citizens have no similar obligation"); id. at
1786 n.51 (noting that under American criminal law and tort law, "[p]rivate citizens do not
have a legal duty to prevent death or substantial bodily harm, even when it is the result of
an intended criminal act"); see also David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical
Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 655 (2006) ("The common law
approach to rescue is straightforward. Absent a limited number of specific exceptions,
there is no duty to rescue, regardless of the ease of rescue and the consequences of nonrescue."); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1986) (noting
that "[the American] legal system is seen as one that ... rarely deters antisocial omissions,
and virtually never rewards rescuers"); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue,
90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980) (observing that "the courts have uniformly refused to
enunciate a general duty to rescue, even in the face of repeated criticisms that the absence
of such a duty is callous").
See generally Simon, supra note 7 (critiquing a
libertarian/formalist vision of legal ethics); William H. Simon, The Belated Decline of
Literalism in ProfessionalResponsibility Doctrine:Soft Deception and the Rule of Law, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1881 (2002) (critiquing literalism in legal ethics).
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in particular, in the American legal system. 66 Even among those who
have questioned, at times convincingly, both the value and the validity of

referring to lawyers as professionals, there remains an abiding insistence
that lawyers maintain high ethical standards.67 Therefore, the absence of
a given obligation in American law need not preclude the possibility that
68
such an obligation should nevertheless be imposed on lawyers. At the

same time, of course, the mere presence of a particular obligation in
Jewish law need not suggest that such an obligation would likewise prove
appropriate in the context of the work of American lawyers. However,
to the extent that the organized bar claims to uphold, as a matter of its
professional responsibility, the ethical values of serving those in need,
against their lawyers, and
protecting clients in potential litigation
S61
recognizing the value of human life, changes in the formulation of the
Model Rules to incorporate mandatory forms of ethical obligation would
demonstrate a more fully realized commitment to these underlying
ethical principles.
B. Beyond the Mandatory/OptionalDichotomy
The possibility of improving the ethical conduct and reputation of
American lawyers through increased mandatory ethics rules may present
the most direct method of enhancing the sense of ethical obligation
among the organized bar. However, as demonstrated in the legislative
history of various provisions in the Model Rules, the ABA has often
remained resistant to articulating ethics rules in expressly mandatory
terms.70 Consequently, to the extent that such resistance continues, it
66. See Rhode, supra note 45, at 1545-46.
67. See sources cited supra note 3 (listing works criticizing the use of the word
professional).
68. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 1, at 50-57 (arguing that "lawyers need to accept
moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional actions" by adhering to
"more ethically demanding professional codes and institutionalized practices"); SIMON,
supra note 1, at 138-39 (discussing a lawyer's responsibility to take actions that "seem
likely to promote justice"); Rhode, supra note 45, at 1546 (arguing that, unlike other
private citizens, "lawyers, as officers of the justice system, have a special obligation to
pursue justice"). Cf James E. Fleming, The Lawyer as Citizen, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1699, 1715 (2002) ("Lawyers ... may attribute only partial authorship of their acts to the
law themselves .... "); Koniak, supra note 34, at 1438 (noting "the potential for ethics
rules to compete and conflict with other law"); Luban, supra note 65, at 473 ("The pro
bono duty, rather than constituting a tax on lawyers, can be viewed as a fee which they pay
the public in return for special privileges granted to the legal profession."); Simon, supra
Some lawyers,
note 7, at 1456-57 ("All lawyers are formalists some of the time ....
however, are formalists all the time . . . . [Tlhey do not feel constrained by any public
interest that is not fully articulated in positive rules. They thus stand ready to exploit
'loopholes' and 'technicalities'....").
69. See discussion supra Part IA-C.
70. See discussion supra Part L.A-C.
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may prove necessary to suggest alternative interpretive methodologies
that aim to promote closer adherence to ethical principles in a manner
more consistent with current formulations of the Model Rules. Toward
that end, approaches to legal and ethical obligation in Jewish law may
again provide a helpful model.
1. Unenumerated Ethical Obligations
Despite the applicability of the Jewish legal system to all areas of
human behavior, as with any set of rules intended to regulate a broad
range of activities, the scope of specific obligations enumerated in the
Torah remains, inevitably, somewhat limited. Indeed, in the words of the
Medieval scholar Nachmanides, "it [would be] impossible to mention in
the Torah all aspects of [a person's] conduct with . ..neighbors and

friends, and all [of a person's] various transactions, and the ordinances of
all societies and countries." 71
Therefore, in addition to the
commandments addressing particular responsibilities and prohibitions,
the Bible prescribes a number of more general principles to be applied to
govern situations not delineated in the Torah.72
Scholars of Jewish law have identified a number of biblical verses that
provide a basis for obligations not expressly enumerated, but no less
mandatory than enumerated commands. The verse "you shall be holy"
has been understood to prohibit behavior that is improper but not
expressly forbidden.73 Similarly, the command to "do the just and the
good" extends the range of interpersonal obligation beyond those actions
enumerated as commandments. 74 The general rule to "love your
neighbor as yourself" prescribes wide-ranging care for the needs and
well-being of others.75 Perhaps the broadest of biblical admonitions, "in
,,76th
all of your ways acknowledge [God],'
captures the centrality of

71. See 5 RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 87-88 (Charles
B. Chavel trans., 1976) (explicating Deuteronomy 6:18); see also Levine, Taking Ethics
Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 543 & n.57.
72. See RAMBAN, supra note 71, at 88; see also Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated
Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study in
Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 516-17 (1998).

73. Leviticus 19:2; see also Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at
547; Levine, supra note 72, at 516-17.
74.

Deuteronomy 6:18; see also Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4,

at 548; Levine, supranote 72, at 520-22.
75. Leviticus 19:18; see also Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at
549; Levine, supra note 72, at 525-26.
76. Proverbs 3:6; see also Levine, Reflections, supra note 55, at 4412-13 & nn.3-6;
Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously, supra note 4, at 1340 & n.5.
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mandatory obligations in Jewish thought by applying the ethical
imperative to all of life's endeavors.77
Of particular relevance to a consideration of the interpretation of
American ethics codes, in addition to identifying biblical sources
articulating broad legal and ethical obligations, scholars of Jewish law
have formulated interpretive methodologies for the derivation and
application of specific unenumerated biblical obligations. 78 For example,
Nachmanides relies upon biblical narrative to delineate the substance of
the instruction "you shall be holy."7 9 Specifically, through an analysis of
the stories of Noah and Lot, Nachmanides concludes that, although not
otherwise the subject of an express commandment, drunkenness is
prohibited as a violation of the notion of holiness. 8° Likewise, employing
a methodology that explores the nature of biblical obligations,
Nachmanides interprets the command to "do the just and the good" as
mandating interpersonal obligations beyond the scope of those
enumerated. 8 Thus, he derives such unenumerated obligations as
adopting a respectful and appropriate attitude and manner toward
others, even in the context of adversarial situations such as litigation
proceedings.82 On a broader level, both Nachmanides and his illustrious
Medieval predecessor, Maimonides, understand the imperative to "love
your neighbor as yourself ' 83 as a basis for requiring an expansive degree
of care and consideration for the interests of others, 84 including, for
example, visiting the sick and comforting mourners.
Notably, in the context of American codes of legal ethics, both courts
and the ABA itself have similarly acknowledged practical limitations to
the range of conduct delineated in enumerated ethics provisions. As
the Unites States Supreme Court observed in 1856, "it is difficult, if not
impossible, to enumerate and define, with legal precision, every offence
77. See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 46 n.137; Levine,
Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously, supra note 4, at 1364-65, 1369-70.
78. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 547-48; Levine, supra

note 72, at 516-17.
79. See Leviticus 19:2.
80.

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 547 (citing 3

(NACHMANIDES),

COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH

RAMBAN

282 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1971));

Levine, supra note 72, at 517.
81.

See Deuteronomy 6:18; Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at

548 (citing 5 RAMBAN, supra note 80, at 87-88); Levine, supra note 72, at 520-21.
82. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 548 (citing 5
RAMBAN, supra note 80, at 87-88); Levine, supra note 72, at 520-21.
83. Leviticus 19:18.
84. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 549 (citing sources);
Levine, supra note 72, at 525-26.
85.

n.50.

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 538 n.48; id. at 540
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[sic] for which an attorney or counsellor [sic] ought to be removed."86
Likewise, in the Preamble to the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the
ABA emphasized that "[n]o code or set of rules can be framed, which
will particularize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of
litigation or in all the relations of professional life."" Moreover, in an
explicit endorsement of unenumerated ethical obligations, the Preamble
declared that "[t]he following canons of ethics are adopted by the
American Bar Association as a general guide, yet the enumeration of
particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the existence of
others equally imperative, though not specifically mentioned." 8 In
addition, a number of courts, including the New York Court of Appeals,
have endorsed the enactment of broad ethics provisions as a means of
regulating those activities otherwise unaddressed in enumerated rules.8 9
In practice, the presence of broad rules in ethics codes has attracted
considerable criticism from courts and scholars alike, who have found
such rules unworkably vague and thus too difficult to interpret and apply
precisely and consistently.90 Responding in part to these arguments, the
ABA omitted from the first version of the Model Rules some of the
broad ethics provisions that had been included fewer than fifteen years
earlier in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.91 Nevertheless,
a number of broad rules remain in the Model Rules and, perhaps more
significantly, broad ethics provisions continue to be enforced by some
courts as a basis for lawyer discipline and/or disqualification in instances
of violations of unenumerated ethical obligations.
The interpretive
methodologies employed by these courts echo, to some degree, those
formulated by scholars of Jewish law for deriving unenumerated biblical
obligations. This suggests the potential for looking more closely at the
Jewish legal system as a model for increasing the degree of obligation in
American legal ethics.

86.

Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14 (1856); see also Levine, Taking Ethics

Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 538-40 & nn.48-49.
87. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Preamble (1908).
88. Id.

89. See In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) ("Broad
standards governing professional conduct are permissible and indeed often necessary."
(citation omitted)); see also Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 540 &

n.49.
90. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 535-37 & n.46, 550-64.
91.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983), with MODEL CODE OF

PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969); see also Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra
note 4, at 530-37.
92. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 550-68; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006).
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For example, both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 93 In a
manner somewhat parallel to the methodology applied to interpret the
command to "do the just and the good," courts have expansively
analyzed principles underlying enumerated ethics rules, thereby
identifying unenumerated conduct likewise prohibited as prejudicial to
the administration of justice.94 Another broad Model Code provision,
omitted from the Model Rules but still retained in a number of
jurisdictions, prohibits "conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer's]
fitness to practice law." 95 In a manner similar to reliance on biblical
narrative to delineate unenumerated obligations mandated in the
imperative "you shall be holy," courts have looked to the nature and
narratives of the practice of law through an examination of "'the
everyday realities of the profession and its overall code of conduct,"'

96

to

derive unenumerated violations of fitness to practice provisions."
Finally, Canon 9 of the Model Code instructs lawyers to "[alvoid [e]ven
the [a]ppearance of [p]rofessional [i]mpropriety.

98

Despite its omission

from the Model Rules, a number of courts continue to apply the
appearance of impropriety standard as a basis for prohibiting a wide
range of unethical yet unenumerated activities, echoing the broad scope
of unenumerated obligations required by the command to "love your
neighbor as yourself." 99 To the extent that courts, scholars, and the
organized bar take these methods seriously, they may potentially impact
the interpretation and application of ethics rules that facially do not
impose mandatory imperatives.
To be sure, it would be implausible to interpret existing Model Rules
provisions to require universal pro bono service, written fee agreements,
or disclosure of confidences to save a life. Indeed, the final version of the
Model Rules presumably expresses the ABA's collective view that, on
balance, such conduct generally should not be obligatory) °°
Nevertheless, the implementation of broad ethics provisions as a means
for the interpretation of these rules might suggest that, at least at times,
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2006); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1983).
94.

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 558-61.

95.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1983).

96.

In re Illuzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 350 (Vt. 1993) (quoting ABAIBNA LAWYER'S

MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 101:1001 (1987)).

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 550-58.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983).
99. See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 562-72.
100. See discussion supra Part I. For a thoughtful analysis of possible motivations for
and implications of the formulation of ethics rules in a discretionary or permissive manner,
see Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, passim.
97.

98.
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such conduct should indeed be considered mandatory. For example,
although circumstances may often support as reasonable a lawyer's
decision not to place a fee agreement in writing, in other cases, the
failure to provide a written fee agreement may appear to have been
designed by the lawyer to gain an unfair advantage over the client.' In
such a scenario, the lawyer's behavior, though technically consistent with
the letter of Model Rule 1.5, may concurrently prove prejudicial to the
administration of justice, may reflect poorly on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law, and/or may carry the appearance of impropriety.
Similarly, against the backdrop of an ongoing debate about
appropriate limitations on the duty of confidentiality, the ABA, through
its promulgation of the current form of Model Rule 1.6, adopts an
approach that places the importance of confidentiality as paramount,
permitting a lawyer to remain silent in the face of resulting danger to
others.'9 However, even among scholars who support expansive
definitions of the duty of confidentiality, many find it unseemly-if not
downright immoral-for a lawyer to maintain a confidence in a case such
as the "Innocent Convict," in which a client confesses to the crime for
which an innocent person is going to be executed. 03 Although Model
Rule 1.6 does not require disclosure in such a case, the failure to reveal
confidences to save the life of a wrongly convicted individual might
arguably be understood to contradict ethical notions of fitness to
practice, proper administration of justice, and/or maintaining
appearances of appropriate attorney conduct.
Finally, scholars have proposed a variety of arguments to support the°4
assertion that pro bono service should be viewed as mandatory.'
Although virtually all jurisdictions seem to concur with the ABA's
general determination, codified in Model Rule 6.1, that pro bono
representation should retain aspirational status,'0 5 a more nuanced
approach might take into account the resources and abilities of a
particular lawyer. In this context, looking beyond the contours of the
language of Model Rule 6.1, a lawyer who is personally and
professionally capable of providing pro bono services, but fails to do so,
might be held to have acted in a way inconsistent with fitness to practice

101. See discussion supra Part I.B.
102. See discussion supra Part l.C.
103. See discussion supra note 44.
104. See sources cited supra note 8.
105. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 392 ("No state yet requires lawyers to
perform pro bono work, and no state is actively considering such a requirement, but a
number of states require lawyers to report their pro bono hours, and other states
encourage lawyers to do so."); see also GILLERS, supra note 2, at 169-70.
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law, promoting the administration of justice, and/or maintaining the
appearance of propriety.
2. Obligatory EthicalDeliberation

Notwithstanding the conceptual validity and practical utility of
employing interpretive methods for deriving unenumerated ethical
obligations through the application of broad ethics provisions, the
dominant attitude among courts, scholars, and the organized bar remains
opposed to such efforts. 1°6 Moreover, the ABA has often demonstrated a
resistance to articulating ethics rules in the form of mandatory
obligations, resorting instead to promulgating discretionary, or
permissive, rules.1 7 As a result, lawyers are often presented with ethical
directives that ostensibly may be either followed, or disregarded, at the
will of the lawyer.
Therefore, given the current formulation of ethics rules, perhaps a
more effective alternative for promoting a greater degree of ethical
obligation should address the underlying assumptions regarding the
nature and consequent interpretation of discretionary ethics rules. Once
again, sources in Jewish law and ethics may prove valuable in the
consideration of such an approach.
Despite the wide range of conduct regulated through both enumerated
biblical commands and extensive unenumerated obligations, many of
life's activities appear to fall outside of the scope of these categories.1°9
Nevertheless, as a number of scholars have explained, those areas do not
comprise a realm of "optional" activities in which individuals may choose
a particular mode of conduct without reflecting upon the ethical
implications. 0 Rather, as instructed in perhaps the broadest of biblical
106.
107.
108.

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 535-37.
See discussion supra Part I. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 5.
See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 270 & nn.16-22, 276-78 & nn.41-55;

Levine, Taking Ethical DiscretionSeriously, supra note 4, at 24.
109. See Moshe Sokol, Personal Autonomy and Religious Authority, in RABBINIC

AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY 169, 207 (Moshe Sokol ed., 1992) ("The fact is
that most of one's waking hours are spent at work, or with one's family. Certainly these
situations call for obedience to appropriate standards of behavior: it is wrong to cheat at
work, for example, or hurt a spouse's feelings. Nevertheless, for great stretches of the day
each individual must decide for [one's self] how [one] will work, with what commitment,
how warm [one] will be toward [one's] children, how much time [one] will spend working
for good causes, and so on."); see also Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra
note 4, at 46 n.137 (citing YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK, Pesach 123-26 (6th
ed. 1999); RABBENU BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, CHovoTH HA-LEVAVOTH (4:4); Aharon
Lichtenstein, Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha?, in

CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS 102,102-23 (Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1978); Sokol,
supra, at 169-216).
110. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 109.

2007]

Taking Ethical ObligationsSeriously

imperatives, "in all your ways acknowledge [God],"'1.. every human
action is subject to ethical considerations and therefore requires careful
ethical deliberation. 112 Indeed, in this framework, the extent to which a
given scenario initially seems beyond the bounds of ethical guidelines
may, in fact, indicate the complexity of analysis necessary to arrive at a
decision in an ethically appropriate manner."' As Rabbi Yitzchak
Hutner observes, although determination of the proper approach to a
situation may depend on specific factors and circumstances, Jewish
thought renders virtually nonexistent the category of conduct that would
be deemed truly "optional" in14the sense of permitting resolution without
regard to ethical deliberation.
At first glance, such an approach appears inconsistent with the stated
attitude of the Model Rules toward discretionary ethics provisions. " '
The Scope section introducing the Model Rules declares that, in contrast
to Rules that "are imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or 'shall not....
[o]thers, generally cast in the term 'may,' are permissive., 16 Because the
latter category "define[s] areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has
discretion to exercise professional judgment," the Scope section cautions
that "[n]o disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses
not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion." 7 Therefore, it
would seem to follow, when an ethics rule leaves a decision to the
discretion of the lawyer, the permissive nature of the rule allows the
lawyer to act without resort to ethical deliberation or justification. 118
Alternatively, however, the Scope section's reference to the lawyer's
"discretion to exercise professional judgment" may be understood to
imply that, although a discretionary rule does not mandate a particular
mode of action, the rule does instruct the lawyer to engage in a
decisionmaking process that involves reliance on the lawyer's
professional judgment.'19 Specifically, this process arguably may require
111. Proverbs3:6.
112. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
113. See Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously, supranote 4, at 1358-69.
114. See HUTNER, supra note 109, at 123-26 (author's translation); see also YITZCHAK
HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK, Purim 51-53 (6th ed. 1998) (author's translation).
115. See infra notes 116-18; see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 280-87;
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 46; McGowan, supra note 38,
at 1825 n.1; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2005).
116.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope [14] (2006).

117. Id.
118. See supra note 6.
119. See Levine, Taking Ethical DiscretionSeriously, supra note 4, at 49 n.140 (arguing
that "with discretion comes the responsibility to exercise professional judgment"); see also
Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 281-82.
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ethical deliberation, including consideration of the ethical implications
and consequences of the lawyer's choice of conduct.' 20 Indeed, a number
of ethics scholars have recently begun to evaluate such a
reconceptualization of discretionary ethics rules,12' suggesting an
approach that in many ways resembles the complex analysis often
necessary in the interpretation and application of the command "in all
your ways acknowledge [God].' 22
Imposing an obligation of ethical deliberation may offer yet another
method for improving the ethical posture of the Model Rules, while
remaining consistent with both the present form of the Rules 23 and their

120. See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 46-52.
121. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 281-87; id. at 285 n.81 (citing Mario
J. Madden, The Indiscreet Role of Lawyer Discretion in Confidentiality Rules, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 603, 604-05 (2001); Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising the Ethical Rules of
Attorney Client Confidentiality: Towards a New DiscretionaryRule, 45 LOY. L. REV. 669,
705-06 (1999)); Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct
Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 790-91 (2005);
Zacharias & Green, supra note 115, at 52-55.
122. Proverbs 3:6; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Ethics and Mystery, 82 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 509, 514-18 (2005). Such an approach may prove particularly
relevant in the context of prosecutorial ethics, given the extent to which prosecutors
exercise discretion in ethical decisionmaking. See Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthics
Seriously, supra note 4, at 1340-41; see also R. Michael Cassidy, Characterand Context:
What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to "Seek Justice," 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 653 (2006) (arguing that "a renewed focus on virtue ... can
provide meaningful guidance for conscientious prosecutors striving to do what is right");
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
616 (1999) (describing the disciplinary rules governing areas where prosecutors have
discretion as "incomplete"); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842 ("The fact that prosecutorial decisions are
discretionary does not imply that they are, or should be, standardless."); Leslie C. Griffin,
The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 262 (2001) (arguing that
prosecutorial discretion relies on both substantive moral theory and public moral
judgment); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
DiscretionaryDecisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1513-14 (2000) (advocating increased
education about the discretionary nature of prosecutors' decisionmaking process); Fred C.
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 248 (1993) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes] ("[M]ost of the unique ethical
dilemmas prosecutors face are governed solely by the ['justice'] requirement."); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 104 (1991) (examining the shortcomings of a "wellinterpreted, reinforced 'do justice' rule").
123. See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 59 n.154
(discussing the deliberative model of legal ethics and noting it can be applied to existing
ethics rules).
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ultimate deference to the lawyer's appropriate exercise of discretion.24
For example, such an approach may not always require that a lawyer
disclose confidential information to protect the life of a third party, but it
likewise would not permit the lawyer blithely to ignore the consequences
of maintaining client confidences regardless of ethical impcatons.
Likewise, while acknowledging the value of pro bono representation
and the potential importance of placing fee agreements in writing, this
approach would nevertheless recognize that such conduct may not always
represent the only appropriate course of action. Thus, lawyers would
maintain the discretion to forego pro bono service or written fee
agreements, subject to the obligation to engage in a careful ethical
analysis supporting the reasoned conclusion that, under the
circumstances, they found another course of action preferable. In short,
a deliberative model of discretionary ethics rules contemplates a variety
of acceptable responses to an ethical question, but at the same time, this
approach takes ethical obligations seriously by insisting that
a response
6
be justified on the basis of meaningful ethical deliberation.
C. Enforcement

Finally, it might be instructive to analyze the possible impact that an
increased degree of ethical obligation might have on enforcement of
ethics rules, as well as the more general ramifications of such a change
for lawyers' adherence to and attitudes toward ethics regulations. In
theory, replacing discretionary rules with rules formulated as

124. Such a framework finds an analogue in the abuse of discretion standard of review
applied to certain kinds of discretionary judicial rulings. See id. at 59-63; see also Green &

Zacharias, supra note 5, at 282.
125. See Levine, Taking Ethical DiscretionSeriously, supra note 4, at 51-55. Cf Maura
Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudencein Legal Ethics, 80

IOWA L. REV. 901, 949-50 (1995) (discussing the practical effects of viewing law as
including something more than positive law).
126.

See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 46-63; see also

Feldman, supra note 6, at 887 ("If one believes that good lawyering practically always
demands good ethical deliberation, then it follows that the honorable mode of legal

analysis should practically always dominate the technocratic one."); Serena Stier, Legal
Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1991) (outlining the integrity thesis,

which makes it possible to "integrat[e] one's cherished personal values with one's
obligations as an attorney"); Wendel, supra note 5, at 6 (pointing to the logical necessity of
uncovering "the moral principles that are implicated by the practice of lawyering"); W.
Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 117 (2000)

("[T]he lawyer seeking to act ethically must take account of different value claims that
may not be comparable with one another in an impersonally rational, mathematical, or
algorithmic manner."); Zacharias, supra note 5, at 1359 (suggesting that lawyers should be
required to discuss certain subjects with clients, so as to aid lawyers in distinguishing
partisanship from objective, independent duties).
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imperatives' sends a message to lawyers that, unlike rules that are
inherently unenforceable, mandatory rules are, indeed, obligatory, and
violations of these rules will be identifiable and, consequently, potentially
subject to enforcement actions. Similar results may be obtained from
interpreting broad ethics provisions to impose unenumerated ethical
obligations'2 and from reconceptualizing discretionary rules so as to
require ethical deliberation. 29 These interpretive methods may promote
adherence to ethical principles, premised in part on the proposition that
ethical obligation extends beyond conduct expressly delineated in
mandatory rules.
Perhaps more likely, however, models of increased ethical obligation
may have a negative effect on efforts to promote enforcement of ethics
rules and adherence to their underlying goals.
On one level,
notwithstanding the theoretical benefits of these models, they may prove
inherently difficult to implement in practice. For example, reliance upon
broad ethics provisions to curtail unethical conduct has been criticized as
imprecise and, therefore, unsuited for enforcement.' 30
Likewise,
evaluating compliance with the requirement of ethical deliberation for
discretionary decisions may prove highly challenging, if not ultimately
elusive.' 3' Although a variety of methods may be offered to overcome
these objections, 132they suggest possible obstacles to enforcement.
More fundamentally, the adoption of models aimed at increasing the
degree of ethical obligation may instead exacerbate problems presently
associated with underenforcement.
As currently adopted and
interpreted, many ethics rules have remained rarely-if everenforced. 33
Although a number of causes may contribute to
underenforcement, including the unenforceability of discretionary
rules,' 34 the failure to enforce mandatory rules may have serious
consequences, potentially undermining the general credibility of ethics
127.

See supra Part II.A.

128.
129.

See supra Part II.B.I.
See supra Part II.B.2.

130.

See Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4, at 535-37 (citing

criticisms).
131. See Zacharias, supra note 5, at 1367 (observing that "[a] requirement of
introspection, by definition, is difficult to enforce," because "[d]iscliplinary authorities
cannot know what lawyers 'have thought,"' and that "[u]pon questioning, lawyers can
rationalize most conduct after the fact"). Cf Stephen Gillers, More About Us: Another
Take on the Abusive Use of Legal Ethics Rules, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 843, 846 (1998)

(positing the "near-impossibility of proving the lawyer's 'true' motive").
132. See Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously, supra note 4, at 59-60 n.154. See
generally Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 4 (responding to various

scholars' objections to broad ethics provisions).
133.
134.

See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6.
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codes as a system of regulation.

Thus, to the extent that additional

models of mandatory ethical obligations prove difficult to enforce, they
accordingly may have the deleterious effect of reducing even further the
perceived authority of ethics codes.
Indeed, Jewish exegetical tradition understands the biblical events of
the Garden of Eden as an illustration of the negative consequences that
may ensue from perceptions of unenforced mandatory rules. 36 As the
Talmud notes, in relating to the serpent God's command not to eat from
the tree of knowledge, Eve states that God has also instructed not to
touch the fruit of the tree."'
Although the motivation
for
Eve's
•
. . ..
131
extension of the prohibition remains open to interpretation,
in the
Talmudic reading of the story, the serpent thereby found an opportunity
to entice Eve to eat from the fruit of the tree. The serpent first caused

135. See Loder, supra note 2, at 328 (summarizing David Luban's analysis that "even
lawyers who believe in the ethical superiority of a certain course of conduct will engage in
substandard behavior if they perceive other lawyers will so behave without sanction" and
that "[s]ince lawyers suspect the unrealistically stringent rules will go unenforced, they will
act not from a rational assessment of the most ethical behavior, but from fear of
professional disadvantage" (citing Luban, supra note 65 at 460 n.24, 461)); Tanina Rostain,
Ethics Lost: Limitations of CurrentApproaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
1273, 1307-08 (1998) ("In a rational-actor model of legal ethics, enforcement-the
detection of wrongdoing, apprehension of the wrongdoer, and conviction-bears the full
weight of ensuring compliance with rules. Even with well-drafted rules and appropriate
sanctions, a regulatory regime will founder unless the rules are enforced at a sufficient
level to deter wrongful conduct."); Zacharias, supra note 2, at 857 ("[U]nderlying most
professional regulation is the faulty assumption that professional discipline works to deter
lawyer misconduct. This premise is inherently questionable. Many aspects of the codes
are not seriously enforced, nor can they be. Moreover, so long as the disciplinary process
remains secret, lawyers are unlikely to be deterred ...." (footnote omitted)); Fred C.
Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 772 (2001)
("[W]hen disciplinary agencies fail to enforce the codes altogether, or fail to enforce them
against a segment of the bar, they encourage disrespect for the codes' letter and spirit.
This disrespect can take numerous forms. At the simplest level, the affected segment of
the bar . . .may simply have less inclination to follow the governing code's mandates.
More subtly ... [their] adversaries may feel a need to counteract the ... misconduct by
engaging in misconduct of their own .... [T]his in turn will reduce their own respect for
the codes and for the disciplinary authorities in other areas." (footnote omitted));
Zacharias, supra note 46, at 1006 ("[S]ubstantial underenforcement of the advertising
rules breeds disrespect for professional regulation. It seems to tell lawyers that the rules
do not mean what they say. In the long run, this may encourage lawyers to violate or bend
other professional rules." (footnote omitted)).
136. See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 29a.
137. Genesis 2:17.
138. Id. at 3:3.
139. See 2 ELIYAHU DESSLER, MICHTAV M'ELYAHU 142 (Aryeh Carmell & Chaim
Friedlander eds., 1995) (author's translation); 1 HARAV BORUCH HALEVI EPSTEIN, THE
ESSENTIAL TORAH TEMIMAH 21 (Shraga Silverstein trans., 1989) (explicating Genesis
3:3).
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4°
Eve to touch the fruit, thus violating God's command as she depicted it.'
Subsequently, when Eve was not punished for her actions, it appeared to
her that God was not enforcing the prohibition. 41 Of course, because her
conduct did not, in fact, violate God's command, which was limited to
not eating from the fruit, Eve was properly not subject to punishment.
Nevertheless, the serpent argued that, just as the supposed prohibition
against touching the fruit had not been enforced, Eve would not be
punished for breaching the prohibition against eating the fruit.' 42 The
serpent's devious logic succeeded in convincing Eve and Adam to eat
from the fruit of the tree, which violated God's command and resulted in
punishments
including their banishment from Eden and their ultimate
43

deaths.'

The Talmud thus concludes with the broader observation that, at
times, the addition of mandatory obligations and prohibitions may prove
to have negative effects.'" Specifically, the failure to enforce obligations
may send the message that wrongful conduct will not be subject to
punishment, thus providing a license for more widespread violations.
Similarly, in the realm of American legal ethics, the addition of ethical
obligations that seem difficult to enforce may serve to amplify a more
general impression among self-interested lawyers that ethics rules are
underenforced and, therefore, do not require adherence. Consequently,
lawyers may increasingly fail to take ethics codes seriously as a source of
ethical guidance and influence.'46

Perhaps, though, problems resulting from underenforcement of ethics
rules are but symptoms of more a fundamental defect in lawyers'
attitudes toward the purpose and function of ethics codes. 47 To the
extent that lawyers perceive ethics codes essentially as a disciplinary
system regulating the practice of law, underenforcement of code

140. See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 29a, Commentary of Rashi.
141. See id.
142. See id.; RASHI, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH (explicating Genesis 3:4),
reprinted in 1 THE METSUDAH CHUMASHIRASHI 31 (Avrohom Davis trans., 4th ed.

1996).
143. See Genesis 3:6-24; see also Samuel J. Levine, The End of Innocence,
HAMEVASER, Dec. 1989, at 8, 8, 10 (exploring rabbinical insights into the nature of the
Tree of Knowledge).
144. See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 29a; see also RASHI, supra note 142, at 31
(explicating Genesis 3:3).
145. See CHAIM SHMULEVITZ, SICHOTH MUSSAR 126-28 (1980) (author's translation).

146. See supra note 135.
147. For discussions of various functions of ethics codes, see Gaetke, supra note 3, at
737-41; Rostain, supra note 135, at 1339 & n.282; Zacharias, supra note 135, at 771-72;
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 122, at 225-39;
Zacharias, supra note 46, at 1003-04.
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provisions undermines the credibility and value of the rules.' 41 Instead,
however, lawyers may seek an alternative function for ethics codes, as
reflecting ethical norms among the community of lawyers and thereby
inherently deserving
of respect, independent of the possibility of
• ••
•
149
enforced discipline. Under such a framework, the primary motivation
148.
149.

See supra note 135; see also Rostain, supra note 135, at 1303-19.
For example, as Professor Gaetke recently observed:
An interesting study of why people obey the law .

. .

. criticizes common

instrumental views of compliance, which posit that peoples' behavior is
"motivated by self-interest" and which lead to a preoccupation with
"manipulation of behavior through the control of punishments and incentives."
It sees such views as inadequate to explain what really determines citizens' desire
to comply with the law. Instead, the study found that people focus on
"normative issues," such as "the legitimacy of legal authorities and the morality
of the law." The author of the study concludes that "[p]eople are more
responsive to normative judgments and appeals than is typically recognized by
legal authorities. Their responsiveness leads people to evaluate laws . . . in
normative terms, obeying the law if it is legitimate and moral." If this is true for
citizens in general, there is reason to believe or at least hope that the same
conclusion could be reached about lawyers and the rules that govern them.
What the ...study suggests ... is that lawyers will be more likely to obey new

rules regarding professional behavior if the rules reflect values that are moral in
their content and are legitimate in the sense that they are supported by a
consensus within the bar.
Gaetke, supra note 3, at 729-30 (quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW

165-68, 178 (1990)) (footnotes omitted) (second and third alterations in original).
Furthermore, Professor Rostain argues that:
While rules are undoubtedly important, the focus of legal ethics cannot be
limited to debates about their content or the schemes through which they are
enforced. For regulation to be effective, it needs to be undergirded by
widespread commitments among lawyers to the values reflected in the regulatory
enterprise. A central concern of legal ethics scholarship must be to investigate,
articulate, and shore-up such collective commitments in the context of law
practice.
Rostain, supra note 135, at 1340. Cf Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of
Ethics and the Wrongs with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 28-29
(1995) ("Unlike tax law, tort law or other sources of legal obligation in our normative
world, ethics is not merely a source of obligation but the place where obligation is
understood as dignifying and ennobling. . . . In legal and judicial ethics we find the
possibility of dignifying obligations that are enforceable as law."); Thomas D. Morgan &
Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a PluralistSociety, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984,
1004-05 (1995) ("The lawyer's moral duty to obey the law rests primarily on the concept of
consent.... The obligation binds because it is self-imposed, self-chosen ....

Lawyers do

stand in a moral relationship with the legal system and do possess duties of fidelity to that
system."); Simon, supra note 45, at 652-58 (proposing "competitive ethical regimes" to
supplement the "low-commitment ethics of the ABA rules").
Building on Professor Robert Cover's work, Professor Koniak has demonstrated that
the bar's nomos includes a commitment to both legal precepts and narratives. See Koniak,
supra note 34, at 90 n.1 (citing Robert M. Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A
Case Study, in NOMOS XXX: RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW: 201 (J. Ronald
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
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for adherence to ethics codes owes more to a shared sense of values than
to the threat of punishmentY °
To conclude this analysis, it may be appropriate to turn once again to
the Jewish legal system to provide an analogue for an alternative vision
of the legal profession. As Rabbi Soloveitchik has eloquently described,
Jewish thought emphasizes fidelity to ethical and religious principles as
an expression of commitment to fulfilling personal and communal
obligations, independent of any possibility of human enforcement.'
Likewise, perhaps lawyers can begin to take ethical obligations more
seriously, embracing rather than resisting heightened expectations of
ethical behavior, thereby demonstrating a shared commitment to values
and principles underlying the practice of law.
11. CONCLUSION

The following story is told of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev, one
of the Chasidic masters around the turn of the nineteenth century:152
Once the Czarist Russian government put a ban on the
importation of all Turkish tobacco. Anyone found possessing
this contraband would be severely punished. One day during
Passover, Rabbi Levi Yitzchak asked his disciples for some
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986)); id. at 1391-92 (arguing that despite the
legal profession's unique dependence on the state, the profession maintains its own

normative world that may coexist or compete with the state's). For examples of
scholarship exploring narrative traditions of lawyers, see Levine, Taking Ethics Codes
Seriously, supra note 4, at 553 n.108; see also Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada:
TranslatingRobert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465.
150. See supra note 149; see also Cassidy, supra note 122, at 692-93 ("Professional
norms are hollow without reference to the moral aspirations and sensitivities of individual
actors working within their framework .... Virtue cannot be taught in law school .... It
also cannot be commanded by rules .... The advantage of virtue theory is that it provides
a noncynical response to this failure of codification."); id. at 693 (responding to criticism
on the generality of virtue theory by suggesting that "a renewed focus on the virtues might
promote a culture of thoughtful decisionmaking in the prosecutorial community, thus
providing individual prosecutors with the intestinal fortitude necessary to resist both
institutional pressures and the unscrupulous direction of other actors within the system");
Rostain, supra note 135, at 1338 (analyzing "the role of collective professional norms in
forming individual commitments" in view of "the importance of participating in shared
practices that foster normative commitments to collective values embodied in law and the
legal framework," as opposed to undue focus on individual discretion).
151. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 54, at 48-50 (author's translation). Indeed, Jewish
history repeatedly offers moving testimony to the power of such commitment, even when
religious adherence has carried its own risk of punishment and persecution.
152. For descriptions of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev's life and teachings, see
ARYEH KAPLAN, THE CHASIDIC MASTERS AND THEIR TEACHINGS 69-85 (rev. 2d ed.
1989); ARYEH KAPLAN, THE LIGHT BEYOND 16-18 (1981); ELIE WIESEL, SOULS ON

FIRE 89-112 (Marion Wiesel trans., 1972).
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Turkish tobacco for his pipe. They scattered through the ghetto
and soon came back with several packets of tobacco, enough to
fill a large can. Rabbi Levi Yitzchak then told his followers to
bring him a piece of bread. They looked at him in astonishment
and protested, "But Rabbi, it is Passover and we have no
bread!'*..
The rabbi's face grew more stern. He repeated, "I command
you as your Rabbi! Search the entire ghetto and bring me a
piece of bread." His followers went all through the ghetto and
ransacked every house in the ghetto. Several hours later they
returned to Rabbi Levi Yitzchak and told him that they were
sorry. They had fine-combed the entire ghetto, and they could
not find a single crust of bread.
Then Rabbi Levi Yitzchak raised his eyes and said, "Master
of the Universe, see how faithful Your children are. The Czar
has hundreds of soldiers, police and agents guarding his
borders, watching that no Turkish tobacco enter his land, yet in
a short while, I can have all I want. But You, 0 [God], have but
once given Your children a commandment not to have bread in
their houses on [Passover],' and to this very day, not a scrap is
to be found."'55
This story provides an insightful lesson about the power of
commitment, and at the same time offers a poignant illustration of both
the effectiveness and limitations of legal rules. In the face of strict
warnings of harsh punishment, the Czar's subjects openly defied the
prohibition against importing Turkish tobacco. Their unwillingness to
commit themselves to these rules rendered futile the Czar's extensive
network of guards enlisted in an attempt to enforce the prohibition. In
contrast, the community's commitment to God's command to rid all
homes of bread on Passover resulted in careful adherence to religious
principles, despite the absence of official human mechanisms of
enforcement. In short, shared communal norms and values prevailed,
while official legal pronouncements remained rejected and ignored.
For more than a century, American lawyers and scholars have
explored various methods of improving the ethical conduct of lawyers
and the reputation of the legal profession. Efforts have ranged from
broad calls for increased professionalism to the enactment of ethics codes
consisting of rules designed to capture essential components of ethical
legal practice. Though not entirely without success, these efforts seem
repeatedly to fall short of producing a genuine sense that lawyers are
153.
154.
155.

See Exodus 12:19.
See id.
ARYEH KAPLAN, ENCOUNTERS 100-01 (1990).
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dedicated to ethical norms. In part, the current state of ethics codes, in
often leaving ethical decisionmaking to lawyers' unfettered discretion,
contributes to the impression that the organized bar continues to place its
own interests above those of both clients and the general public.
Therefore, formulating and interpreting various ethics provisions to
impose a greater degree of mandatory ethical conduct might demonstrate
a resolve among lawyers to take more seriously their ethical obligations.
Perhaps more importantly, however, in place of a reluctant adherence to
ethics rules out of a fear of possible enforcement, the community of
lawyers must be willing to undertake a sincere commitment to ethical
conduct, premised upon a shared sense of ethical values and principles.

